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LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
THE 1974 JUVENILE PACKAGE
Right to Treatment
A juvenile proceeding has traditionally been considered a civil
matter and not a criminal trial, with the state assuming the role of
parens patriae rather than that of prosecuting attorney and judge.,
Similarly, courts have considered the goals of the juvenile system to
be rehabilitative, not penal.2 Still, due process imposes fundamental
fairness limitations upon the state in its treatment of juvenile offend-
ers, although juvenile proceedings do not require all the safeguards
of a criminal trial.3
Since the parens patriae rationale allows juveniles to be commit-
ted to institutions under conditions and procedures much less rigor-
ous than those required by the criminal justice system, recent federal
court decisions have recognized that due process requires the state to
fulfill its parental obligations.' Because rehabilitation is the justifica-
tion for confinement, the state must rehabilitate, not simply incarcer-
ate, its children. In assuming the parental role, the state must tender
what a good parent would provide-individualized care and treat-
ment necessary for rehabilitation.' Much of the legislation enacted
during the 1974 session as the Juvenile Package' was in response to
such decisions enunciating the juvenile's constitutional "right to
treatment."7
1. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
2. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (D.R.I.
1972).
3. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974); Morales v. Turman, 16 BNA
CRIM. L. REP. 2050 (E.D. Tex. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as Morales I]; Morales
v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Morales 1];
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of Boys' Training
School v. Affieck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
5. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
6. La. Acts 1974, Nos. 558 (R.S. 46:1901-26), 609 (R.S. 15:1081-83), 155 (R.S. 13:
1580), 563 (R.S. 13:1580(5)), 424 (R.S. 13:1583), 559 (R.S. 13:1578.1), 560 (R.S.
13:1577(D,E)), 568 (R.S. 13:1571.1-.4), 561 (R.S. 13:1586.1 (E,F)), 564 (R.S. 15:1137),
567 (R.S. 15:1138), 562 (R.S. 13:1583.1).
Not discussed in the text, are La. Acts 1974, No. 257 (R.S. 15:840) which directs
the Department of Corrections to establish and maintain a drug education and rehabil-
itation program at all juvenile correctional institutions under its jurisdiction, and No.
683 (R.S. 17:416(A)), adding drugs to the list of controlled dangerous substances the
use of which in school buildings or on school grounds may lead to a student's suspen-
sion.
7. The rationale of the "right to treatment" is that "effective treatment must be
the quid pro quo for society's right to exercise its parens patriae controls." Martarella
v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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Act 558 creates the Division of Youth Services as part of the
Louisiana Health, and Social and Rehabilitation Services Adminis-
tration to act as a vehicle for individualized and specialized treat-
ment of juveniles. The purpose of the agency is to "improve, inten-
sify, and coordinate" the state's efforts in preventing delinquency
and in rehabilitating the state's delinquents. The functions of govern-
mental bodies concerned with furnishing preventive and rehabilita-
tive services to juveniles were centralized in the Division, which is
authorized to establish programs for the study of delinquency and to
train personnel who provide private or public services to juveniles.'
The establishment of a system for training personnel in the juvenile
field is important in light of the holding in Morales v. Turman' that
a state's failure to employ qualified personnel to serve in its juvenile
rehabilitive efforts is a denial of the juvenile's right to treatment.
The new agency is also empowered to develop or to assist in the
development of a regional system of licensed community-based resi-
dential child-caring institutions."0 The legislature's move to encour-
age the development of community centers may be required to fulfill
the system's goal of rehabilitation, especially after the second
Morales decision." Finding two Texas rural juvenile institutions com-
pletely devoid of rehabilitative purposes, the federal district court in
Morales 1I ordered the institutions closed and replaced with
community-based alternatives. The court held that Texas could not
simply institutionalize all its juvenile delinquents, because the juve-
nile's constitutional right to treatment requires that children be
provided with the least restrictive mode of treatment, specifically
community-based facilities and programs. The same court had ear-
lier held that the right to treatment requires the state to allow or to
encourage the participation of family and interested friends in juve-
8. La. Acts 1974, No. 558, adding LA. R.S. 46:1905 (Supp. 1974).
9. Morales I, 364 F. Supp. 166, 175 (E.D. Tex. 1973): "Failure to employ an
individual who is qualified by education, experience, and personal attributes to super-
intend the rehabilitation of juveniles who have engaged in seriously delinquent behav-
ior constitutes a violation of those juveniles ... right to treatment." See also Morales
II, 16 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 2050, 2053 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
The appointment of the Division's director is to be made on the basis of his
knowledge of and interest in the problems and programs of the Division and his ability
to administer its programs. La. Acts 1974, No. 558, adding LA. R.S. 46:1904 (Supp.
1974).
10. La. Acts 1974, No. 558, adding LA. R.S. 46:1905 (Supp. 1974).
11. Morales I, 16 BNA CRIM. L. REP. 2050 (E.D. Tex. 1974). The Louisiana
legislature's establishment of a system of community centers was not in response to
this decision which was rendered in Sept., 1974, after passage of Act 558.
12. Morales , 16 BNA CrM. L. REP. 2050, 2051 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
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nile rehabilitative programs."3 Such participation is more readily
available through a system of community centers. 4
To insure that the court and the newly created Division of Youth
Services is kept in touch with delinquents throughout the period of
treatment, Act 609 requires that the Division be notified whenever a
juvenile is assigned to, transferred from, or released from a non-state
operated institution or child placing agency. In addition, non-state
operated institutions and agencies are to furnish a quarterly evalua-
tion of each child in their care to the court which committed the child
and inform it of the child's progress."
The effectiveness of treatment can be diminished if children who
are more susceptible of rehabilitation are incarcerated with serious
juvenile offenders. Acts 155 and 563, amending R.S. 15:1580, make
important changes with respect to the orders juvenile courts may
make regarding children brought before them. Act 155 declares that
a child who has not been adjudicated delinquent" may not be com-
mitted to the Department of Corrections and that an adjudicated
delinquent under the age of thirteen shall not be committed to the
Department of Corrections unless he was adjudicated a delinquent
for the commission of an act which would have been a felony if com-
mitted by an adult. The Division is empowered by Act 558 to oversee
non-state institutions, a function formerly held by the Department
of Corrections,"' which now retains authority only over state institu-
tions.1 Since jurisdiction over any children who cannot be committed
13. Morales I, 364 F. Supp. 166, 175 (E.D. Tex. 1973).
14. Through Acts 564 and 567, the 1974 legislature further provided guidelines for
the establishment of community-based institutions. La. Acts 1974, No. 564, adding LA.
R.S. 15:1137 (Supp. 1974), authorizes the use of local court-approved private facilities
for the rehabilitation of delinquents and specifies that such institutions are to be
located where employment, education and training opportunities are readily available.
La. Acts 1974, No. 567, adding LA. R.S. 15:1138 (Supp. 1974), provides for the reim-
bursement to communities of funds expended for the care and maintenance of delin-
quents committed to community-based institutions, provided such institutions are
certified by the Division of Youth Services.
15. La. Acts 1974, No. 609, amending LA. R.S. 15:1081-82 (1950). The Division of
Youth Services shall compensate such institutions and agencies, if the parents of such
children are financially unable to do so. La. Acts 1974, No. 609, amending LA. R.S.
15:1083 (1950).
16. A child brought before a juvenile court can be adjudged a neglected child, a
delinquent child, or a child in need of supervison. LA. R.S. 13:1580 (1950). LA. R.S.
13:1569 (1950) defines a delinquent act as "an act designated a crime under the stat-
utes or ordinances of this state, or of another state if the act occurred in another state,
or under federal law."
17. LA. R.S. 15:1081, 1082 (1950).
18. LA. R.S. 15:902 (1950).
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to the Department of Corrections will fall to the Division of Youth
Services, they will be committed to non-state institutions and thus
are effectively separated from more serious juvenile offenders. Fur-
ther, Act 563 authorizes the court to order a delinquent who is four-
teen years of age or older to attend a state supported school or
vocational-technical school if the school agrees to admit him."9
In shaping the right to treatment, the courts have emphasized
the need for effective psychiatric services for committed juveniles. 0
Act 424 attempts to insure that juveniles who are committed to facili-
ties for the mentally retarded are not simply detained, but are treated
as well. The Act states that no court may commit a juvenile to a
state-supported residential facility for the mentally retarded unless
it has first been determined through a professional examination'
that the child's needs can be met in an available facility possessing
the physical space and staff necessary to implement "a program spe-
cific to the needs of the individual. ' 2
Pre-Adjudicatory Detention
Detention of the juvenile during the pre-adjudicatory stage has
been a matter of concern to some experts. 23 Generally, detention is
19. La. Acts 1974, No. 563, adding LA. R.S. 13:1580(5) (Supp. 1974). The Act
further provides that the school shall not use the adjudication of delinquency as a
factor in deciding whether to admit the child. See also Morales , 16 BNA CRIM. L.
REP. 2050, 2052 (E.D. Tex. 1974): "The right to treatment also includes the right to
adequate counselling and training, including on-the-job training, and facilities and
procedures for helping youths obtain work in the community." Cf. Inmates of Boys'
Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1374 (D.R.I. 1972) where the court
refused to decide whether petitioners had a claim to positive rehabilitative treatment
in the form of vocational training, declaring that there was insufficient showing that
vocational training is a necessary part of a rehabilitation plan.
20. See Morales I, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973); Inmates of Boys' Training
School v. Affieck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972). Cf. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493
F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), noted in 35 LA. L. Rav. 563 (1975).
21. The examination is to be made by a diagnostic and evaluation team appointed
by the Division of Mental Retardation. At least one member of the evaluation team
must be a qualified mental retardation professional. La. Acts 1974, No. 424, amending
LA. R.S. 13:1583(B) (1950).
To carry out the evaluations requested by the courts as authorized by Act 424, Act
562 directs the Louisiana Health, and Social and Rehabilitation Services Administra-
tion to establish a diagnostic center for delinquent children in New Orleans. La. Acts
1974, No. 562, adding LA. R.S. 13:1583.1 (Supp. 1974).
22. La. Acts 1974, No. 424 amending LA. R.S. 13:1583(B) (1950).
23. A survey of juvenile court judges has shown that they believe pre-adjudicatory
detention is the most pressing problem facing the juvenile justice system. Smith, A




warranted only when necessary for the protection of the child or the
public. 4 However, the lack of adequate legislative guidelines presents
the possibility that pre-adjudicatory detention will be used as a
means of punishment or treatment before hearing. 5
Prior to the enactment of Acts 559 and 560, Louisiana law re-
quired that a juvenile apprehended by police be released to his par-
ents or guardian upon a promise to produce the child in court unless
it was impracticable or inadvisable or had otherwise been ordered by
the court." Act 559 establishes a more explicit standard for permissi-
ble detention, authorizing detention of a child alleged to have com-
mitted a delinquent act" only after demonstrable evidence is pre-
sented that he is likely to commit another delinquent act before re-
turning to court or that a substantial probability exists that he will
not appear in court."8 Further, he may only be detained for as long
as is essential to accomplish these purposes, and under Act 560 must
be released after seventy-two hours if a petition alleging his delin-
quency has not been filed. 9 If the new guidelines are conscientiously
applied, the possibility of undue hardship to the juvenile will be
lessened.
Waiver Procedure
Waiver is the procedure by which a juvenile court abstains from
exercising jurisdiction and the juvenile is instead tried in a criminal
district court 2 ° Characterizing the decision to try a juvenile in an
24. "To be consistent with the philosophy of juvenile court legislation, a child
should not be incarcerated pending a hearing unless necessary to protect him or to
protect society from him. It would be legitimately protecting a child to detain him
when he is physically neglected by parents, when serious mental disorders seem
present, or when he has no other place to go. It would be proper protection of society
to detain when the crime a child is suspected of committing is a major felony, the
presumption of guilt is great, and past behavior or present attitude indicate release
may be followed by further misbehavior. In all other instances, a child should be
released to his parents. Detention should never be a means of punishment or 'treat-
ment' before hearing." Comment, 27 LA. L. REv. 606, 612 (1967).
25. See generally Sarri, The Detention of Youth in Jails and Juvenile Detention
Facilities, 24 Juv. JUSTICE, no. 3, at 2 (1973).
26. LA. R.S. 13:1577 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 714 § 1; Comment,
27 LA. L. REv. 606, 614 (1967).
27. See note 16 supra.
28. La. Acts 1974, No. 559, adding LA. R.S. 13:1578.1 (Supp. 1974). In addition,
the Act provides that if either or both of these two conditions exist, a child can be
detained overnight "for another jurisdiction." Id. The apparent meaning of the phrase
"for another jurisdiction" is "at the request of another jurisdiction."
29. La. Acts 1974, No. 560, adding LA. R.S. 13:1577(D) (Supp. 1974).
30. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 46 (1972).
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adult court system as "critically important," the United States Su-
preme Court in Kent v. United States3' held that the waiver proce-
dure must meet certain standards to comply with due process: the
juvenile is entitled to a hearing at which he is represented by counsel;
all social records relied upon by the judge must be made available to
the child's lawyer; the juvenile must be furnished a statement of the
court's reasons for its decision to waive jurisdiction.2
Before adoption of Act 568, the concept of juvenile court waiver
was unknown to Louisiana law.33 In establishing the state's waiver
procedure, 4 Act 568 conforms to the due process requirements enun-
ciated in Kent, declaring that after a petition alleging delinquency
is filed, the alleged offender may be transferred for prosecution in the
district court only if all the following requirements are met: (1) The
alleged offender has attained the age of fifteen; 5 (2) The juvenile has
been granted a hearing at which he has been represented by counsel;36
(3) Notice has been given the child and his parents at least ten days
before the hearing; (4) There are reasonable grounds to believe that
the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation through the
facilities available to the juvenile court; (5) The child has been pre-
viously adjudicated a delinquent by the commission of second degree
murder, manslaughter, negligent homicide, simple rape, armed rob-
bery, aggravated battery, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson or
aggravated kidnapping. The Act also provides that a judge preside
at the waiver hearing, that the proceeding be recorded, and that the
general public be excluded. The only admissible evidence is that
31. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
32. Id. at 557.
33. Under the prior law, jurisdiction over the juvenile offender was exclusively
vested in the juvenile court, with the exception of a child fifteen years of age or older
charged with a capital crime or attempted aggravated rape. Since the juvenile court
had no jurisdiction over the child at all, this instance would not be properly character-
ized as waiver. See LA. R.S. 13:1570 (1950).
34. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 19 which allows the legislature to establish a waiver
procedure by a two-thirds vote of each house.
35. Compare CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, &
WELFARE, STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT 34-35 (1966), which recommends
that the child be at least sixteen years of age before jurisdiction is waived.
36. The Act also provides that if the child cannot afford to retain counsel, the
court is authorized to appoint an attorney to represent him. La. Acts 1974, No. 568,
adding LA. R.S. 13:1571.3 (Supp. 1974).
37. Neither the record of the hearing nor the reasons for the transfer shall be
admissible in evidence in any subsequent criminal proceeding; however, such records
are admissible for impeachment purposes. La. Acts 1974, No. 568, adding LA. R.S.
13:1571.2(C) (Supp. 1974). See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). But see State v.
Williams, 309 So. 2d 303 (La. 1975). The child may be excluded from the hearing if
[Vol. 35
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which pertains to the Act's transfer criteria and that needed to deter-
mine Whether there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile
committed the alleged delinquent act." At the waiver hearing, the
youth is granted the right to confront witnesses and the right against
self-incrimination. Finally, either the child or the state may have the
juvenile court's waiver decision summarily reviewed by the Louisiana
supreme court."
The provision that a child may not be transferred for trial in the
district court unless he has been previously adjudicated delinquent
by the commission of one of the listed offenses may create a serious
problem. A major oversight in drafting is the omission of attempted
aggravated rape and felonies punishable by death. Perhaps these
offenses were omitted because the juvenile court has no jurisdiction
to hear a case where a juvenile fifteen years or older is charged with
attempted aggravated rape or a felony punishable by death." How-
ever, the language of the new waiver provision means that waiver
cannot be based upon a juvenile court's prior delinquency adjudica-
tion of a juvenile under fifteen for attempted aggravated rape or a
felony punishable by death; nor can waiver be based upon a district
court conviction of a fifteen year old for these offenses. Thus, if a child
commits aggravated rape when he is fourteen and aggravated bur-
glary when he is sixteen, the juvenile court may not transfer the case
to the district court-a result hardly consonant with the policy of the
waiver provision.
Louisiana's first waiver procedure, though a commendable effort
to make transfer "discretion free," represents a marked departure
from the previous insulation of the juvenile from the criminal courts
and could be strengthened to provide more protection for the juve-
nile. For example, the statute should limit waiver to instances when
his conduct is disruptive of orderly proceedings. La. Acts 1974, No. 568, adding LA.
R.S. 13:1571.2(D) (Supp. 1974).
38. La. Acts 1974, No. 568, adding LA. R.S. 13:1571.4(A) (Supp. 1974). In allowing
the introduction of evidence for a determination of probable cause, the Act implies that
a finding of probable cause is necessary for a valid waiver; however, the affirmative
consequences of a failure to find probable cause are not made clear by the statute.
39. La. Acts 1974, No. 568, adding LA. R.S. 13:1571.4(B) (Supp. 1974). This provi-
sion is preferable to the automatic dismissal in Kent which was based on the reasoning
that if the juvenile court's waiver order was found invalid, the district court's judgment
had to be vacated and the defendant freed because he was no longer subject to the
juvenile court's jurisdiction.
40. See LA. CONST. art. V, § 19; La. Const. art. VII, § 52 (1921); LA. R.S. 13:1570
(1950); State ex rel. Moore v. Warden of Louisiana State Penitentiary, 308 So. 2d 749
(La. 1975).
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the juvenile is accused of an offense which if committed by an adult
would be a felony.4'
Destruction of Juvenile Records
Act 561 alters the procedure for obtaining the destruction of
juvenile records. Previously, the juvenile was afforded the right to the
immediate destruction of records pertaining to matters which had
been dismissed.42 The new Act continues the prior law and provides
that persons adjudged neglected or in need of supervision and juve-
niles adjudicated delinquent as a result of committing minor criminal
acts43 can obtain the destruction of their records at any time. Prior
law also allowed any juvenile offender to obtain the destruction of his
records after two years.4 Under the new provision, a delinquent who
is unable to obtain the immediate destruction of his records may do
so five years after his final discharge, provided he was not adjudged
delinquent on the basis of a violent crime against the person.,5
Joseph Bradley Ortego
UNINSURED MOTORIST PROTECTION
Uninsured motorist (UM) insurance is designed to protect the
insured from injury by an automobile not covered by liability insur-
ance.' In effect, it insures against a tortfeasor's lack of insurance.2 A
41. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE,
STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS 34-35 (1966), which recommends that the
child be accused of a felony before jurisdiction is waived. See also MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27.3178 (598.4) (1944).
42. LA. R.S. 13:1586.1 (1950).
43. The Act includes the following within the non-exclusive enumeration of minor
criminal acts: simple criminal damage to property, criminal mischief, criminal tres-
pass, theft where the misappropriation or taking amounts to a value less than one
hundred dollars, receiving stolen things when the value of the thing is less than one
hundred dollars, unauthorized use of movables. La. Acts 1974, No. 561, amending LA.
R.S. 13:1586.1(E) (Supp. 1972).
44. LA. R.S. 13:1586.1(F) (Supp. 1972). Prior to the change, Louisiana's two year
period was one of the shortest in the country.
45. Violent crimes against the person include first degree murder, manslaughter,
negligent homicide, aggravated battery, aggravated assault, aggravated rape, simple
rape, aggravated kidnapping, armed robbery and extortion. La. Acts 1974, No. 561,
amending LA. R.S. 13:1586.1(F) (Supp. 1972).
1. UM insurance is not to be confused with "no-fault" insurance in force in other
states. Under UM insurance, the insured recovers from his own insurer, but fault is
still an important issue. Thus, the insured must establish the legal liability of the
uninsured motorist to recover under the UM provisions of his own policy.
2. I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILrrY INSURANCE § 17.01 (1974).
[Vol. 35
